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This article analyses how a firm’s returns are affected when a bank
becomes a large blockholder. We investigate this issue by taking into
consideration the types of blockholders that build coalitions with banks
in order to control a firm. We find that the effect on a firm’s returns is
negative when a bank buys the largest stake and forms coalitions with
other banks. However, this negative effect does not apply in other
situations. We underscore our theoretical conjectures based on an
empirical analysis of a panel dataset comprising a representative sample
of listed and unlisted Spanish firms over the period 1996 to 2000.
I. Introduction
Recently, the literature on ownership structure has
broadened its main focus by considering not only
agency problems between managers and share-
holders, but also those potential conflicts between
large shareholders and minority shareholders
(Zwiebel, 1995; Pagano and Ro ¨ ell, 1998; Gomes
and Novaes, 2005). Large shareholders want to gain
control in order to enforce decisions that would give
them some private benefits of control at the expense
of minority shareholders. To model this feature, the
literature on this subject departs from a concept of
ownership concentration that is based on one major
blockholder and a diverse group of small share-
holders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1986; Berglo ¨ f, 1990), to another that
incorporates different large blockholders in a firm’s
ownership structure. This latter approach allows us
to address strategic issues, such as the formation
of coalitions between the main blockholders and
their effects on a firm’s policy (Bennedsen and
Wolfenzon, 2000; Morck, 2000; Bloch and Hege,
2002; Gomes and Novaes, 2005). Our article relies
on this literature and studies the effect on a firm’s
returns when a bank becomes one of the largest
shareholders of a firm that has other blockholders.
Our basic claim is that this effect is very much
related to the characteristics (whether or not they
are banks) of the blockholders with whom banks
can form coalitions in order to achieve the effective
control of a firm.
The literature has not yet reached a consensus on
the effect of banks’ ownership on a firm’s returns.
Some papers find a negative effect (Hellwig, 1998;
Morck et al., 2000; Goergen et al., 2005), while
others, relying on the monitoring expertise of banks,
describe a positive relationship (Cable, 1985; Kaplan
and Minton, 1994; Boehmer, 2000; Gorton and
Schmid, 2000). Finally, there is a strand of the
literature that does not find a clear-cut relationship
(Prowse, 1992; Zoido, 1998
1). Hence, the debate
remains open and there is no conclusive evidence as
to what the real effect could be.
*Corresponding author. E-mail: joatribo@emp.uc3m.es
1Zoido (1998) finds no relationship using accounting measures, but finds a positive relationship using market data.









































































1This article contributes to the debate by focusing
on the nature of the largest blockholders (individuals,
corporations, families, banks) that control a firm.
The aim is to find out whether the types of coalitions
that banks may form with other specific blockholders
has an effect on a firm’s profitability. Our conjecture
is that once a bank has become one of the largest
blockholders and is compelled to form coalitions with
other blockholders to control a firm, it has more
expropriating incentives if the accompanying block-
holders are banks, as opposed to other types of
blockholders.
To test our theoretical contention, we carry out an
empirical investigation on a sample of Spanish firms
for the period 1996 to 2000. This sample is composed
mainly of nonlisted firms; however, we also perform
a separate analysis for listed firms. Making use of
accounting data as well as market data, we find that
the results confirm in essence our main conjecture:
once a bank acquires the status of main blockholder,
it produces a negative impact on a firm’s returns
when it colludes with other banks. However, this is
not true in other situations.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows:
Section II develops the theoretical underpinnings;
in Section III, some descriptive analysis is shown and
Section IV displays the econometric study. An
analysis of robustness is carried out in Section V.
The article ends with some final remarks.
II. Theoretical Underpinnings
The role of banks as blockholders
Banks (henceforth, we use the word banks to refer to
both banks and savings and loans institutions) are
special as blockholders because they have a signifi-
cant influence on firms in which they have a holding
that far outweighs the magnitude of their stake.
Santos and Rumble (2006) report that 25% of their
sample of 403 US firms from the Standard & Poor’s
(S&P) 500 have a bank nominee on their board
although the Glass–Steagall Act restricts banks from
buying stocks in firms.
2 For Japan, Hoshi and
Kashyap (2001) report that 52% of the 761 firms
listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, in 1992, had a bank nominee on their
board. Edwards and Fischer (1994) find that 75% of
the 100 largest, publicly traded firms in Germany had
a bank nominee on the board in the previous
20 years. However, the percentage of banks’ share-
holdings compared with their overall assets is just
4.6% in Japan and 4.8% in Germany (Santos, 1998).
Hence, banks have a presence on the boards in firms
even though they do not hold commensurate share-
holdings. This influence can be explained in terms of
the different channels through which banks accumu-
late power.
The first channel that banks may use to exercise
their power is the lending channel. Shareholder banks
tend to be lenders as well (Kroszner and Strahan,
2001; La Porta et al., 2003). Undoubtedly, by
controlling the credit channel in firms where they
have a stake, blockholder banks can boost their
influence given that they have the ability to block
loan renewals when firms need them most (Gorton
and Winton, 2003). They gain more muscle with
which to influence a firm’s decisions in line with their
own interests (e.g. forcing a firm to borrow money at
higher than market rates). Gonza ´ lez (2004) shows
that for a sample composed of 24 Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries, banks may use their shareholder position
in nonfinancial firms as a mechanism to extract
benefits from the lending relationship that they
usually maintain with firms in which they take
equity. Santos and Rumble (2006) show for a
sample of US firms that this lending relationship is
even more important than voting power in explaining
the presence of banks on the boards.
Second, banks may hold proxies for minority
shareholders with whom they are closely linked
through their voting rights (Berglo ¨ f, 1990; Rajan and
Zingales, 2003). For example, as reported by Gorton
and Schmid (2000), in Germany investors generally
deposit their stock with a bank and give the bank
permission to vote on their behalf (proxy voting). As
a consequence of this delegation of power, banks
generallysitontheboardandmayexerttheirinfluence
in the firm as reference blockholders.
Finally, banks may resort to cross-shareholdings
and pyramidal schemes so as to augment their power
in excess of that corresponding to their stake.
Degryse and de Jong (2006) provide evidence of
cross-shareholdings for the Netherlands, while Becht
and Boehmer (2002) show this aspect for Germany.
Also, banks take part in pyramidal schemes which
give them firms’ control even though they have a
small individual stake. La Porta et al. (1999) show
the existence of pyramidal schemes in Spain that
are larger than the average for a sample composed
of 27 different countries. Finally, Gorton and
2The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 has loosened restrictions imposed by the Glass–
Steagall Act of 1933 on bank ownership of equity in nonfinancial firms.







































































2Winton (2003) explain how banks use stock pyramids
to concentrate their voting powers.
3
Within this scenario, the rents accruing to banks
due to control are much higher than those derived
from their stakes. This situation provides controlling
blockholders (banks) all the more incentive to
expropriate minority shareholders; they have suffi-
cient power to force expropriation in order to further
their own interests, while only internalizing a small
proportion of the expropriating costs as a conse-
quence of their low stake.
The presence of other blockholders
We argue that banks’ stockholdings may stimulate
expropriating strategies thereby damaging a firm’s
returns. However, the effective implementation of
such a strategy, when a bank does not exercise
effective control of a firm, will be contingent on the
type of accompanying blockholder that a bank has
to contend with. Within this scheme, we may find a
whole set of results of the presence of banks on a
firm’s returns given the variety of possible accom-
panying shareholders colluding with banks.
The literature on this issue confirms this prediction.
Several studies, such as Cable (1985), Gorton and
Schmid (2000), for Germany; and Hoshi et al. (1990),
for Japan, show the existence of a positive relation-
ship between banks’ ownership and firm returns.
They emphasize the positive view of banks as stable
shareholders that are specialists in monitoring. Other
works do not find a significant relationship (Zoido,
1998, for Spain; Edwards and Nibler, 2000 as well as
Chirinko and Elston, 2006, for Germany; and
Prowse, 1992,
4 for Japan). Finally, other papers,
such as Banerjee et al. (1997) for holding companies
in France; Morck et al. (2000),
5 show the existence of
a negative relationship due to the strong power of
banks.
Our contention is that it is possible to reconcile the
previous results if we incorporate into the analysis
the types of coalitions that banks form with other
blockholders in order to control a firm. We argue
that homogeneous coalitions between banks
expropriate more and, consequently, have a particu-
larly negative effect on a firm’s returns. However, this
may not be the case when a noncontrolling block-
holder bank colludes with nonbanks to control a
firm.
6 We base this statement on the following
factors.
First, banks tend to follow more homogeneous
patterns in their investment decisions in comparison
with other types of blockholders. According to
Saunders and Walter (1994), German banks are
risk-averse investors who invest mainly in large
firms. Winton (2001) connects this homogeneous
investment pattern as responses to banks’ liquidity
considerations given their needs to meet unexpected
withdrawals or loan takedowns. These potential
liquidity needs also explain banks’ investment in
their own conservative sector (Crespı´-Cladera and
Garcia-Cestona, 2002 for Spain). Thus, the homoge-
neity in investment patterns among banks will lead to
the convergence of interests and will facilitate collu-
sion to expropriate the minority. We define this as the
homogeneous effect.
Second, banks can overcome potential disagree-
ments that may hinder their collusive agreement
because they have access to a wide range of
perquisites to choose from in order to materialize
their collusive agreements aimed at expropriating.
This is particularly true in European countries where
universal banks offer a wide range of services apart
from credit. These different services, ranging from
insurance to consulting and underwriting, define a set
of channels that facilitate not only the direct expro-
priation of firms but also the co-operation among
blockholder banks in order to extract rents from
the firm.
The previous arguments suggest that when banks
form coalitions among themselves (homogeneous
controlling coalitions); they reinforce their expro-
priating strategies, resulting in a particularly negative
effect on a firm’s returns. Conversely, when a bank
forms a controlling coalition with a nonbank, the
process of decision-making is influenced by a
bargaining effect. These are the potential difficulties
that a group of blockholders may face when agreeing
3An additional issue is the presence of dual class-shares that, if controlled by banks, would stimulate to a larger extent these
expropriating problems. However, this is not a major problem in Spain given that Faccio and Lang (2002) report that in 1997
only 0.16% of the 632 listed Spanish firms in their sample have a dual-class equity structure. For nonlisted firms, this
proportion should even be lower given that the lack of liquidity for shares facilitates the control of the largest shareholders
without using such type of shares.
4This author finds a positive relationship for independent Japanese firms, but this is not the case for firms that are members of
corporate groups (keiretsu).
5These authors find a negative relationship in a sample of Japanese banks, when their stake in their partially-owned firms is
moderated.
6Applied to another type of blockholder (families), Maury and Pajuste (2005) analyse a sample of Finnish listed firms and
they find that the coalition of two families has a negative effect on a firm’s value, while the opposite is true when the coalition
is with a nonfamily owner (generally a financial institution).







































































3on expropriating the minority, particularly when the
number of banking relationships, whether as share-
holders or lenders (Han et al., 2008), increases.
7
Finally, and complementary to the negative
effect on a firm’s returns linked to minority expro-
priation actions by a homogeneous coalition of
banks, we expect a second effect: the reduction in
the stake of the controlling blockholders – to mini-
mize expropriating costs. Also, we expect such a
reduction in the stake of other noncontrolling
blockholders that are less interested in investing in a
firm where the largest blockholders expropriate from
the remaining ones. Then, our first hypothesis reads
as follows:
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative impact on a firm’s
returns, as well as on the stake of the controlling
blockholders and on that of all blockholders, when a
bank acquires one of the largest stakes in a firm that
has other banks as controlling blockholders.
Then, if we focus on heterogeneous blockholder
structures composed of banks and nonbanks, we
expect different results contingent on the type of the
largest blockholders. In particular, structures with a
bank as the leading shareholder should generate more
intensive expropriating policies. A bank as a leading
shareholder has strong bargaining power and can
impose expropriating actions by ignoring contrary
opinions from other nonbank blockholders in this
heterogeneous structure. We define this as the leading
effect. Boehmer (2000) making use of a sample of
German bidder firms shows that takeovers only
increase the value of acquiring firms that have
banks as blockholders, if banks are not the largest
blockholders and the control is counterbalanced by
another type of shareholder.
Additionally, the aforementioned negative impact
on a firm’s returns would also be followed by a
reduction in the stake of the controlling coalition as
well as in the stakes of those blockholders that do not
belong to that coalition as a way of minimizing
expropriation costs. Hence, our second hypothesis
states as follows:
Hypothesis 2: When a bank buys a significant stake in
a firm that does not have other banks with large
stakes, there is more expropriation when it acquires
the largest stake as opposed to the second-largest one.
This means that the effect on a firm’s returns and on
the stake of the largest blockholders is more negative
in the former than in the latter case.
III. Database and Descriptive Analysis
The Spanish banking sector
The banking sector is regulated in Spain. However,
Spanish financial institutions have full autonomy to
set interest rates for their loans and deposits, and they
are also free to decide on their commercial policy in
terms of the number of branches and locations. Three
main types of institutions compete in this sector:
banks, Savings and Loans (S&L) and cooperatives.
However, the first two types are the most important
as they account for 95% of the loan and deposit
markets (Crespı´-Cladera et al., 2004). Of these two
types of institutions, saving and loans have shown the
largest increase in market share at the expense of
banks. In particular, the market share of savings
banks was 39.8% of the deposit sector, and 33.9% of
the loans market, in 1990; however, by December
2002, the figures were 46.9% and 44.1%, respectively
(Crespı´-Cladera et al., 2004). Such an increase in
market share can be explained by the particular
corporate governance of S&L whose objective func-
tion also incorporates stakeholders’ interests
(Granero and Redondo, 2005).
The decline in interest rates, as a result of the
convergence to the EMU and deregulation
(Kumbhakar and Lozano, 2004), has resulted in a
decline in the spread between lending and borrowing
rate, which has put pressure on banks to converge
and improve their efficiency (Lozano, 1998) and
create value (Guzma ´ n and Reverte, 2008). In 1990,
this spread was 5.5 percentage points, whereas by the
year 2000, the spread was only 3 percentage points.
This process of convergence facilitated the integration
of different services within a single bank. The end
result was that financial institutions were endowed
with sufficient muscle to acquire significant stakes in
industrial firms and influence decisions through their
presence on boards. Hence, the Spanish case is a
natural framework for studying the possible expro-
priating actions of banks as blockholders.
The data
We carry out our empirical analysis making use of a
sample of Spanish firms for the period 1996 to 2000.
This sample is extracted from the Sistema de Ana ´ lisis
de Balances de Empresas Espan ˜ olas (SABE) data-
base. This database is compiled by Bureau Van Dijk
and provides annual information on balance sheets,
income statements and other complementary
7It may also be the case that a blockholder bank has a stake in another. Such a possibility may hinder the bargaining effect,
while stimulating banks’ expropriating intentions in the case of the presence of different banks in a firm’s ownership regardless
of their number.







































































4information, such as a firm’s ownership. We focus on
nonfinancial firms that provide information on own-
ership. We apply some filters to rule out firms with
inconsistencies in their balance sheets.
8 The final
outcome is an unbalanced panel data of 4400 firms,
the majority of which are nonlisted (133 firms that
represent 3% of the sample are listed), with 12629
observations for the period 1996 to 2000. Once we
impose the condition that firms should provide
information in all variables that define specifications
(1) and (2) to be contrasted, and that the stake of the
largest blockholder is lower than 50%, the sample
decreases to 1330 firms and 4083 observations.
9 Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) (less than 250
employees) account for over 90% of our sample; this
is comparable with the proportion (84%) for the
overall economy. Moreover, the distribution of eco-
nomic sectors in our sample closely matches those of
the Spanish economy. Hence, we are confident that
our sample is representative of Spanish firms.
Descriptive evidence
In this section, we show the main characteristics of
the ownership structure of Spanish firms and the role
that banks play in those structures. The variables
used throughout the study are defined in Table 1.
Table 2 shows that the average stake of the two
largest shareholders is 53.80%. Hence, it seems
reasonable to focus on the two main shareholders
as a firm’s controlling blockholders (henceforth, we
denote the two largest blockholders as controlling
blockholders). We also consider the stake of all
blockholders, whose mean stake is 70.91%. We
define blockholders as those shareholders with a
stake of at least 5%. Concerning the variables of
performance, the mean Return On Assets (ROA) is
1.09, while the mean Tobin_Q is 1.28, which indicates
that the mean firm of the sample is not one of growth.
Next, we present evidence of different factors that
influence banks’ ownership as well as the types of
coalitions that banks form with other blockholders in
order to control a firm.
Table 3 shows that banks tend to form coalitions
with other banks rather than with nonbanks: a bank
emerges as the largest blockholder with a probability
of 22.75% when the second-largest shareholder is also
a bank and with a probability of 1.15% when it is not.
Also,theseprobabilitiesare20.8%versus1.04%when
wefocusonthepresenceofbanksasthesecond-largest
blockholders. This means that there is a higher
probability that one of the largest shareholders is a
bank when the other is also a bank, instead of another
type of blockholder. Also, from Table 3, we can
extract the conclusion that there is a lower probability
of finding banks that hold stakes after a period such
that DEBT_ASSETS has a larger value than the mean
of the sector for the corresponding year. This result
may be consistent with the idea that banks are eager to
expropriate and consequently avoid those situations
where the slack in resources to expropriate from are
lower (i.e. when debt level is large, according to the
free cash-flow theory; Jensen, 1986).
Next, we focus on the consequences of bank
ownership on blockholders’ stake and on a firm’s




In order to investigate whether banks holding the
largest stakes expropriate minority shareholders, we
focus on the changes in blockholders’ stake as well as
on the returns of those firms with bank stakehold-
ings. Our strategy is to estimate two different models:
one, on a firm’s returns and the other on the main
shareholders’ stake as well as on the overall
blockholders’ stake. We recognize the potential
endogeneity between both variables by allowing
each dependent variable in one equation to enter as
an independent variable in the other one. This is
shown to be the case in studies such as Demsetz and
Villalonga (2001).
We conduct a longitudinal study of the effects of
changes in a firm’s controlling blockholders that are
linked to banks. In particular, we focus on these
effects on a firm’s ownership and returns. We identify
five possible changes in those controlling coalitions
that involve banks. They are described by five
different dummy variables (‘transitional dummies’)
that are defined in Table 1 (NBNB_BNB;
NBNB_NBB; NBB_BB; BNB_BB; NBB_BNB).
10
By using these variables, we capture the effect of
8We have ruled out those firms with negative values in positive-defined accounts (sales, debt, intangibles). Also, we have
eliminated from our sample those firms where the sum total of the stakes of the controlling blockholders is larger than 100%.
9We impose that the stake of the largest blockholder should be lower than 50% for allowing the formation of coalitions of
more than one blockholder. Otherwise, the largest blockholder would have had the effective control of the firm, making the
analysis of the effect of the other blockholders on performance irrelevant.
10We have not included transitional dummy NBNB_BB, because there are no observations in our sample of a firm where two
banks simultaneously become the two largest blockholders in a firm that did not previously have banks as blockholders.







































































5Table 1. Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Bank-related variables
BANK1 A dummy that is equal to 1 if the main shareholder is a bank and 0 otherwise.
BANK2 A dummy that is equal to 1 if the second-largest shareholder is a bank and 0 otherwise.
BB A dummy that is equal to 1 if the two largest shareholders are banks and 0 otherwise.
BNB A dummy that is equal to 1 if the main shareholder is a bank, but the second largest is not a
bank, and 0 otherwise.
NBB A dummy that is equal to 1 if the second-largest shareholder is a bank but the largest one is
not a bank, and 0 otherwise.
NBNB A dummy that is equal to 1 if the two main shareholders are not banks and 0 otherwise.
NBNB_ BNB A dummy that is equal to 1 when two conditions are satisfied: in period t 1 none of the two
largest shareholders are banks (NBNB¼1); and in period t the largest shareholder is a bank
but the second-largest one is not (BNB¼1). It is equal to 0 in the rest of the cases.
NBNB_ NBB It is equal to 1 when two conditions are satisfied: in period t 1 none of the two largest
shareholders are banks (NBNB¼1); and in period t the second-largest shareholder is a
bank but the largest one is not a bank (NBB¼1). It is equal to 0 in the rest of the cases.
NBB_BB A dummy that is equal to 1 when two conditions are satisfied: in period t 1 the
second-largest shareholder is a bank but the largest one is not a bank (NBB¼1); and in
period t the two largest shareholders are banks (BB¼1). It is equal to 0 in the rest of the
cases.
BNB_BB A dummy that is equal to 1 when two conditions are satisfied: in period t 1, the largest
shareholder is a bank but the second-largest one is not (BNB¼1); and in period t the two
largest shareholders are banks (BB¼1). It is equal to 0 in the rest of the cases.
NBB_BNB A dummy that is equal to 1 when two conditions are satisfied: in period t 1, the
second-largest shareholder is a bank but the largest one is not a bank (NBB¼1); and in
period t the largest is a bank but the second-largest one is not (BNB¼1). It is equal to 0 in
the rest of the cases.
NLNBNB_ BNB The result of multiplying NL times NBNB_BNB, where NL is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 when banks as shareholders do not have a lender relationship with the firm
and 0 otherwise.
Stake variables
OWNALL Combined ownership of those blockholders with a minimum stake of 5%,
OWN2 Measures the ownership stake of the two largest shareholders.
Performance variables
ROA Ratio of earnings, before interest and taxes to a firm’s assets.
TOBIN_Q It is approached by the market-to-book ratio (the market value of equity to the book value of
equity).
Control variables
LSALES Firm overall sales on a log scale.
AGE Firm age.
R&D The ratio of R&D expenses to sales.
DEBT_ASSETS Firm total debt to total assets.
Table 2. Descriptive analysis
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Min Max
Stake variables
OWNALL 4083 70.915 34.794 0 100
OWN2 4083 53.802 28.957 0 100
Performance variables
ROA 4083 1.098 0.099 0.460 2.971
TOBIN_Q 166 1.282 4.959 0.036 42.603
Control variables
LSALES 4083 14.646 1.416 6.882 21.225
AGE 4083 22.290 15.130 2 77
R&D 4083 0.007 0.068 0 3.115
DEBT_ASSETS 4083 0.184 0.172 0 0.900
Note: See the definition of variables in Table 1.







































































6the emergence of a bank as one of the two largest
blockholders on a firm’s ROA, and on blockholders’
stake (OWN2 and OWNALL variables). In those
periods when there is such a change, one of the
previous five ‘transitional’ dummies changes from a
value of zero to a value of one.
We adopt in both specifications those control
variables which are standard in this literature
(Morck et al., 1988; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).
In particular, for estimations of OWN2 and
OWNALL, we introduce the following controls;
first, size measured as a firm’s overall sales on a log
scale (LSALES). Second, reputation, gauged through
a firm’s age (AGE). Third, we also incorporate a
variable of financial structure (DEBT_ASSETS) that
is defined as the ratio of a firm’s total debt to total
assets. Finally, we also introduce the aforementioned
measure of a firm’s returns (ROA), as well as
temporal dummies (DumyT) and sectoral dummies
(1-digit SIC DumyS). Thus, the specifications we
carry out for OWN2 as well as for OWNALL are as
follows:
OWNit ¼ 0þ 1NBNB BNBitþ 2NBNB NBBit
þ 3NBB BBþ 4BNB BBitþ 5NBB BNBit








 18þTDumyTitþ iþ"it ð1Þ
where OWN denotes OWN2 in some specifications,
and OWNALL in others. The error term, "it, has a
normal distribution with zero mean and a  2
variance. Variable  i accounts for the unobservable
heterogeneity.
The second equation, which is linked to the
previous one because it incorporates OWN2 or
alternatively OWNALL as an independent variable,
is intended to estimate the effect on a firm’s returns
when banks buy a significant stake in a firm. The
equation we propose has the same controls as the
previous specification as well as an additional one
for identification purposes. Demsetz and Villalonga
(2001) propose R&D, defined as the ratio of R&D
investments to total assets, as an explanatory variable
of firm’s performance. Summarizing, our second
equation is
ROAit ¼  0 þ 1NBNB BNBit þ 2NBNB NBBit
þ 3NBB BBþ 4BNB BBit
þ 5NBB BNBit þ 6 OWN fg itþ 7LSALESit












it is the error term which has a normal
distribution with zero mean and a  02 variance.
Variable  0
i accounts for the unobservable
heterogeneity.















ROA_1¼1 1.492% 1.368% 2.587%
ROA_1¼0 1.351% 1.242% 2.245%
p-value
a (0.522) (0.552) (0.233)
DEBT_ASSETS_1¼1 1.170% 0.996% 2.945%
DEBT_ASSETS_1¼0 2.026% 2.026% 3.612%
p-value
a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: Table 3 shows the probabilities of the presence of banks as one of the largest shareholders contingent on
different variables. ROA_1 measures the return on assets lagged by one period. ROA_1¼1 (0) means that
ROA_1 is above (below) the mean value of that variable for the corresponding sector and year. DEBT_ASSETS
is defined as a firm’s total debt to total assets. DEBT_ASSETS_1 is the variable DEBT_ASSETS lagged by one
period. DEBT_ASSET_1¼1 (0) means that DEBT_ASSET_1 is above (below) the mean value of that variable
for the corresponding sector and year. The remaining variables are defined in Table 1.
aThe p-values of the Mann–Whitney tests are given in parentheses.







































































7When estimating both equations we have to take
into consideration the existence of two endogeneity
problems. First, the unobservable heterogeneity
( i, 0
i) may be correlated with some independent
variables. The second endogeneity problem is linked
to the possibility that the largest blockholders’ stakes
have an effect on performance in specification (1).
This would generate biased results in such specifica-
tions. Also, it may be the case that in specification (2)
a firm’s ROA drives blockholders to change their
stakes in a firm. In that case, the estimation of a
firm’s returns would also be biased. In order to tackle
both endogeneity problems, we perform system
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimations
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) following a two-stage
process.
11 In the first stage, we conduct a system
GMM estimation of both specifications, using as
instruments of the ‘transitional dummies’ and the
potential endogenous variables (ROA and OWN),
these variables lagged by different periods as well as
the remaining predetermined variables (control vari-
ables). In the second stage, we repeat the GMM
estimations and, apart from the lagged transitional
dummies as instruments, we instrument ROA in
specification (1) and OWN in specification (2), using
the error term that is found in the estimations of the
first stage. Note that this error term in specification
(1) is correlated with OWN but it is not correlated
with ROA. Thus, it is a good instrument of OWN in
specification (2). In the same vein, the error term of
specification (2) is correlated with ROA but it is not
correlated with OWN. Thus, it is a good instrument
of ROA in specification (1).
12
Results
The results of Equation 1 are presented in Table 4,
while those of Equation 2 are shown in Table 5.
13
Table 4 shows that the emergence of a bank as one
of the largest blockholders leads to a reduction in the
overall blockholders’ stake, as well as in that of the
two largest blockholders, whenever the other block-
holder is also a bank (negative coefficients of
NBB_BB as well as BNB_BB).
14 This conforms to
Hypothesis 1, concerning the stake variable.
Remarkably, the coefficient is more negative when a
bank becomes the largest blockholder (NBB_BB¼1)
instead of the second largest one (BNB_BB¼1). This
significant differential negative effect when a bank
acquires the largest stake also holds when the second
largest is not a bank (heterogeneous structures). In
particular, the coefficient of NBNB_BNB is more
negative (see columns 1 and 3) compared with that
of NBNB_NBB (a bank becomes the second-largest
blockholder of a firm that has a nonbank as the
largest blockholder). This conforms to Hypothesis 2,
for the stake variable. Also, columns 2 and 4
reveal that the status of a nonlending bank generates
11System GMM differs from difference GMM as the former not only uses information of the equations in differences, but also
incorporates the information of the equation in levels. In particular, following the description given for xtabond2 command of
Stata program, departing from the model:
y it ¼ x it b 1 þ w it b 2 þ u it i ¼ 1;...;N; t ¼ 1;...;T
u it ¼ v i ¼ e it,
where: x_it is a vector of strictly exogenous covariates; w_it is a vector of predetermined covariates (which may include lags
of y) and endogenous covariates, all of which may be correlated with the v_I (Predetermined variables are correlated with past
errors. Endogenous variables are correlated with past and present errors.); b_1 and b_2 are vectors of parameters to be
estimated; v_i are unobserved group-level effects; e_it is the observation-specific error term; and E[v_i]¼E[e_it]¼0,
E[v_i*e_it]¼0, and E[e_it*e_is]¼0 for each i, t, s, t<>s. The difference GMM version transforms the equation in differences
in order to remove the vi, thus eliminating a potential source of omitted variable bias in estimation. (However, in first
differences, predetermined variables become endogenous.) Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a GMM estimator that treats
the model as a system of equations, one for each time period. The equations differ only in their instrument/moment condition
sets. The predetermined and endogenous variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels.
Strictly exogenous regressors, as well as any other instruments, enter the instrument matrix in the conventional instrumental
variables fashion: in first differences, with one column per instrument. A problem with difference GMM estimator is that
lagged levels are often poor instruments for first differences, especially for variables that are close to a random walk. System
GMM overcomes this problem by adding the original equations in levels to the system. Then, additional moment conditions
could be brought to bear to increase efficiency. In these equations, predetermined and endogenous variables in levels are
instrumented with suitable lags of their own first differences.
12We have also conducted a simultaneous equation estimation (Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) estimation) and the results
found remain qualitatively the same.
13We have computed the Variation Inflation Factor (VIF) in all estimations, and for all coefficients the VIF factor is lower
than 5, which is well below the threshold of 20 that is considered as a signal of multicollinearity problems. Additionally the
Belsley et al. test (1980) rejects such a multicollinearity problem.
14An alternative interpretation of the reduction in the stake in the hands of the largest shareholders may be due to banks
preference for investing in large companies with more diluted ownership. However, note that the estimation technique that we
have used compares the controlling stake of a particular firm before and after banks change their stakes.







































































8a further reduction in blockholders’ stakes, a
result that suggests further expropriating intentions
by nonlending banks rather than for lending ones
(this is shown in the negative and significant 1%
coefficient of NLNBNB_BNB).
15 Finally, it is worth
emphasizing, once we compare the coefficients of
NBB_BB with that of NBNB_BNB, that the entrance
of a bank as the largest shareholder has more
negative effects on the stake when it is accompanied
by another bank, than with other type of bloc-
kholder. This reinforces the idea that it is particularly
damaging for blockholders interests to have the
combination of a bank with large power (leading
effect) accompanied with other banks (homogeneous
effect).
Remarkably, the results found hold for OWN2 as
well as for OWNALL. This means that expropriation
affects both the controlling and noncontrolling
blockholders. The former reduce their stake as a
way of minimizing expropriating costs. The latter
disinvest drastically in a firm that pursues the private
objectives of controlling blockholders.
Concerning the relationship between ownership
structure and performance, the results for the
Table 4. Effects on blockholders’ stake
Dependent variable OWN2 OWNALL
NBNB_BNB  10.183* 11.900  15.58** 15.822**
(6.372) (8.230) (8.705) (3.848)
NLNBNB_BNB  33.50***  41.791***
(9.563) (4.507)
NBNB_NBB  9.271***  18.150***  4.164  12.422*
(2.631) (6.625) (9.488) (7.636)
NBB_BB  22.270***  21.23***  26.710***  40.815***
(2.898) (3.256) (3.373) (6.447)
BNB_BB  12.039***  11.90***  11.150***  11.207***
(1.251) (1.100) (1.339) (4.417)
NBB_BNB  10.961***  7.531**  19.420***  14.812
(1.890) (3.570) (3.803) (5.698)
ROA 24.721** 27.83**  2.870 2.201
(1.217) (14.220) (16.360) (12.465)
LSALES  0.443*  0.334  0.772**  0.625**
(0.266) (0.272) (0.321) (0.331)
AGE  0.292***  0.301***  0.387***  0.327***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.063) (0.064)
DEBT_ASSETS 4.570 52.51 2.614 2.784
(3.538) (3.669) (4.331) (4.182)
CONSTANT 56.44*** 59.14*** 90.040*** 88.760***
(8.376) (4.289) (5.326) (8.637)
Fitness of the model 54.790 102.630 93.990 127.46
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen test 7.180 14.000 21.690 14.640
(0.618) (0.450) (0.150) (0.199)
AR(2) test 0.610 1.130  1.530  1.13
(0.540) (0.257) (0.127) (0.257)
Observations 4083 4083 4083 4083
Notes: Table 4 reports the effects on ownership concentration caused by changes in a firm’s ownership
structure associated with the presence of banks as the two main shareholders. See Table 1 for the definition
of variables. All are GMM estimations; we take as instruments of the transitional dummies, the set of these
variables as well as the predetermined control variables lagged by one or further periods. ROA is
instrumented using the error term of the specification of ROA in Table 5 as described in the main text.
F-test for the fitness of the model tests. The Hansen test reports the J-statistic (p-values reported in
parentheses), which is distributed as chi-squared under the null hypothesis of instruments validity (no
correlation with the error term). The AR(2) is a test for a second-order serial correlation in the residuals
which is distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. SDs are given in
parentheses.
***, ** and * denote p-values 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.
15As in Table 5, we report only the coefficient of the variables that are the result of crossing the dummy NL with the
transitional dummy NBNB_BNB, given that for the other transitional dummies, these variables fall into two categories: their
coefficients are not significant or they are dropped due to multicollinearity problems.







































































9specification of OWN2 confirm that firms adjust
their ownership structure in response to their results.
Our results, however, are less clear than those of
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), because ROA is
only significant for the specification of OWN2. We
can argue that Demsetz and Villalonga’s study
focuses on US-listed companies where costs to con-
veniently change a firm’s ownership structure are low.
In our database, there are only 133 firms (3% of the
original sample) listed on the stock market, which
hinders changes in the ownership structure as time
goes by.
Finally, control variables show that older and
larger firms have more ‘diluted’ ownership. It is quite
natural that a firm is initially owned by just a few
shareholders and that these dilute their initial own-
ership with time.
The estimations of ROA are displayed in Table 5.
In columns 1, 2 and 5, we use the variable OWN2
as proxy for blockholders’ stake, while in columns 3,
4 and 6, we use OWNALL. In both cases, as
we have explained in the methodological section,
we instrument such variables through the error terms
derived from the corresponding specifications
Table 5. Effects on performance
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA1
NBNB_BNB  1.870 1.158  0.632 1.931  0.018  0.016
(2.584) (2.113) (2.371) (2.902) (0.086) (0.085)
NLNBNB_BNB  10.070**  19.144***
(5.237) (7.357)
NBNB_NBB 0.752  0.994 0.393  1.786  0.007  0.004
(1.140) (1.139) (0.957) (1.972) (0.019) (0.019)
NBB_BB  8.686***  6.532***  5.643**  3.943**  0.121**  0.112**
(1.650) (1.421) (1.885) (2.162) (0.056) (0.054)
BNB_BB  2.555  0.007  1.156  1.755 7.752 7.070
(3.557) (2.384) (3.162) (3.593) (4.875) (4.534)
NBB_BNB 3.799 1.658 3.754 2.432  0.036  0.034
(2.184) (1.728) (2.017) (2.924) (0.026) (0.026)
OWN2  0.001***  0.000***  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OWNALL  0.000  0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LSALES 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.005** 0.005**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D  0.181**  0.111  0.250***  0.371**  0.090***  0.094***
(0.087) (0.096) (0.081) (0.176) (0.017) (0.016)
DEBT_ASSET  0.104***  0.088***  0.097***  0.056  0.059***  0.062***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.044) (0.016) (0.015)
CONSTANT 0.088 0.014 0.171 0.0464 0.012 0.011
(0.126) (0.118) (0.117) (0.088) (0.043) (0.037)
Fitness of the model 38.860 41.590 41.100 52.600 14.390 14.430
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen test 11.970 12.780 5.630 3.890 6.750 6.850
(0.287) (0.236) (0.776) (0.793) (0.564) (0.552)
AR(2) test 1.550 1.650 1.560 0.090 1.340 1.310
(0.122) (0.100) (0.119) (0.925) (0.181) (0.190)
Observations 2838 2838 2838 2838 2362 2362
Notes: Table 5 reports the effects on returns caused by changes in a firm’s ownership structures associated with the presence of
banks as the two main shareholders. See Table 1 for the definition of variables. All are GMM estimations; we take as
instruments of the transitional dummies, the set of these variables as well as the predetermined control variables lagged by one
or further periods. OWN2 and OWNALL are instrumented using the error term of their corresponding specification shown in
Table 4 as described in the main text. Columns 1–4 report the results for ROA, while in columns 5 and 6 the dependent
variable ROA is lead by one period (ROA1).
F-test for the fitness of the model tests. The Hansen test reports the J¼statistic (p-values reported in parentheses), which is
distributed as chi-squared under the null hypothesis of instruments validity (no correlation with the error term). The AR(2) is
a test for a second-order serial correlation in the residuals which is distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation. SDs are given in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote p-values 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.







































































10of ownership in Table 4. Finally, in columns 5 and 6,
we show the estimations for columns 1 and 3, but
leading the dependent variable by one period.
The results in Table 5 can be summarized as
follows:
(1) There is a negative effect on a firm’s returns
when a bank buys the largest stake in a firm
that already has another bank as the second
largest shareholder (NBB_BB¼1). This means
that it is harmful for a firm when the emergence
of a bank represents a change from a hetero-
geneous structure (NBB¼1) to a homogeneous
one (BB¼1), especially when a bank holds the
largest stake. This supports Hypothesis 1. Also,
when we compare the coefficient of NBB_BB
with that of NBNB_BNB in columns 1 and 3,
we do find that the latter is negative, but not
significant and it is only significant for non-
lending banks as shown in columns 2 and 4.
Thus, we can state that a bank, on becoming
the largest blockholder, has a negative impact
on a firm’s returns but only when accompanied
by other banks or when it is a nonlending
bank. Hence, the degree of homogeneity in the
type of coalitions that banks can form in order
to control the firm (homogeneous effect) has a
relevant impact on a firm’s returns when the
largest blockholder is a bank (leading effect).
This behaviour conforms to Hypothesis 1.
16
However, according to such hypothesis, we
also expect a negative sign for variable
BNB_BB. We may argue that a firm with a
blockholder structure BNB suffers expropria-
tion from its controlling bank in such a way
that the emergence of a second bank has only
marginal negative effects on ROA.
(2) In heterogeneous structures (bank with non-
bank), the emergence of a blockholder bank
has a negative effect on returns when it holds
the largest stake (NBNB_BNB¼1) and is not
a lending bank. This result provides partial
support to Hypothesis 2.
(3) Concerning control variables, we find the
following results. First, size has a positive
effect on ROA. Second, leverage has a negative
effect on ROA. Investment inefficiencies like
debt overhang (Myers, 1977) may explain this
negative outcome.
17 Finally, R&D, as a proxy
of growth opportunities has a null or negative
impact on ROA. This is a standard result when
we use accounting measures to capture the
profitability (Hitt et al., 1997). This result
does not hold when we use market measures
(Table 6).
V. Robustness Analysis: Market Data
Another way to extend our analysis is by focusing on
listed firms. This allows us to use market measures of
a firm’s results, instead of accounting measures. In
particular, we measure market performance through
the market-to-book ratio as an approximation of
Tobin’s Q. We are conscious that the number of
observations in all of these estimations is limited, so
the results obtained must be analysed with some
caution.
Table 6 shows the results for the estimation of the
determinants of the stake of blockholders as well as
that of a firm’s performance. Also, we use the same
two-stage process, described in the methodology, to
tackle potential endogeneity issues. In columns 1 and
2 we show the results for the specifications of OWN2
and OWNALL, while in columns 3 and 4, we show
the results for the specification of Tobin’s Q. In
columns 5 and 6, we replicate specifications of
columns 3 and 4 but using ROA as the dependent
variable.
The analysis of OWN2 and OWNALL (columns 1
and 2) reveals that there is a decrease in blockholders’
stake when a bank becomes the largest shareholder
and the second largest shareholder is another bank.
Note that for such a scenario we have also found the
most significant effects on blockholders’ stake for the
overall sample (Table 4). Consistently, the analysis of
performance shows that independently of whether
we use market measures of performance (columns 3
and 4) or accounting ones (columns 5 and 6), the only
variable that affects performance negatively is
NBB_BB. Thus, for listed firms we only find a
16In Table 5 (columns 5 and 6), we present the results of leading the variable of performance by one period and, although still
significant, the coefficients capturing the impact of changes of ownership in performance are one order of magnitude lower
than those capturing the contemporaneous relationship. Such evidence indicates that firms adjust their ownership structure,
although imperfectly, and there is some persistence effect of changes in the ownership structure on a firm’s performance.
17Our result of a negative effect is consistent with the existence of high levels of leverage in Spanish firms in which the negative
overhang problems outweigh the positive ones linked to tax benefits as well as reduction in agency problems due to a
reduction in cash-flows (Jensen, 1986; Del Brio et al., 2003). Moreover, when we focus on listed firms (Table 6), debt plays a
positive role in performance, which conforms to De Andre ´ s et al. (2005) for a sample of 101 listed Spanish firms for the period
1991 to 1995.







































































11negative effect on performance when the homoge-
neous effect (the two largest blockholders are banks)
is combined with the leading effect (a bank acquires
the largest stake). In the other scenarios, pressure
from financial markets prevents expropriation by
banks.
VI. Conclusions
In this article, we study the impact on a firm’s
returns when a bank becomes a shareholder with a
significant stake. We also look at the effect on
blockholders’ stakes.
We propose two hypotheses: first, there is a
negative impact on a firm’s returns, as well as on
the blockholders’ stake, when a bank becomes a large
blockholder in a firm where other banks hold large
stakes (homogenous effect). Second, in a firm without
banks as large blockholders, the expropriating
incentives of a bank that buys a significant stake is
greater when this stake is the largest, as opposed to
when it is not (leading effect).
Such results are confirmed in the empirical analysis
that uses a panel data sample of Spanish firms, which
Table 6. Effects on blockholders’ stake and performance (listed firms)
OWN2 OWNALL TOBIN_Q ROA
NBNB_BNB  1.495 5.470 15.320 13.470  0.075 0.024
(19.280) (35.890) (22.529) (15.754) (0.103) (0.048)
NBNB_NBB  4.494 17.800  6.290 5.682 0.234  0.025
(13.720) (17.200) (28.870) (10.773) (0.314) (0.045)
NBB_BB  38.640***  38.170***  8.221**  9.257***  0.885*  0.075**
(8.600) (11.910) (3.900) (3.449) (0.552) (0.036)
NBB_BNB  24.010 12.060 25.600** 12.653*** 0.253*** 0.126***
(39.160) (67.300) (10.770) (3.589) (0.074) (0.045)
TOBIN_Q  0.081  1.367*
(0.499) (0.773)
OWN2 0.000  0.001
(0.049) (0.000)
OWNALL  0.044  0.000
(0.047) (0.000)
LSALES 1.766  0.648 0.102  0.053 0.003 0.003
(1.187) (1.085) (0.476) (0.291) (0.005) (0.002)
AGE  0.123  0.153  0.003 0.019  0.000  0.000
(0.082) (0.167) (0.030) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D  85.900  14.262 0.383  0.632
(114.800) (52.042) (2.161) (0.405)
DEBT_ASSET 4.188 12.290 12.660 9.183 0.096 0.375**
(15.100) (30.430) (16.100) (13.800) (0.446) (0.113)
CONSTANT 1.663  69.300  3.350  0.627  0.021 0.009
(18.390) (118.380) (8.088) (5.210) (0.075) (0.045)
Fitness of the model 11.110 34.660 49.010 128.45 27.570 67.870
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen test 4.910 3.910 8.230 6.500 0.370 7.150
(0.980) (0.990) (0.600) (0.591) (0.990) (0.950)
AR(2) test 0.510  0.550  1.520  1.410 1.130 0.260
(0.612) (0.585) (0.129) (0.159) (0.250) (0.797)
Observations 166 166 166 166 166 166
Notes: Table 6 shows, for listed firms, the effects on blockholders stake (columns 1 and 2), on market performance (columns 3
and 4) and on accounting performance (columns 5 and 6) due to changes in ownership structure associated with the presence
of banks as the two main shareholders. See Table 1 for the definition of variables. All are GMM estimations; we take as
instruments of the transitional dummies, the set of these variables as well as the predetermined control variables lagged by one
or further periods. TOBIN_Q is instrumented using the error term of the corresponding specification in columns 3 and 4,
while OWN2 and OWNALL are instrumented using the error term of their corresponding specification in columns 1 and 2 as
described in the main text.
F-test for the fitness of the model tests. The Hansen test reports the J-statistic (p-values reported in parentheses), which is
distributed as chi-squared under the null hypothesis of instruments validity (no correlation with the error term). The AR(2) is
a test for a second-order serial correlation in the residuals which is distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation. SDs are given in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote p-values 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.







































































12is mainly composed of nonlisted firms, covering the
period 1996 to 2000. More specifically, when a bank
becomes the main blockholder in a firm that has
another bank as the second-largest blockholder, there
is a negative effect on a firm’s returns. However,
when a bank buys the largest stake of a firm that has
a nonbank as the shareholder with the second largest
stake, the effect on performance is negative only
when the bank is a nonlending bank. Finally, in those
situations where there is a decrease in a firm’s returns,
there is also a reduction in the stake of the largest
blockholders. This is further evidence of banks’
expropriating intentions mirrored by the reduction
in their controlling stake as a way of minimizing
expropriating costs.
The previous results confirm in essence our basic
statement: a bank expropriates minority shareholders
when it buys the largest stake and especially when it
forms a coalition with other banks. However, the
presence of a bank, per se, does necessarily generate
negative returns in a firm where it has a holding.
Concerning possible limitations, a major drawback
in our article is that it does not address the question
of who the ultimate owner is, given the existence of
indirect investment. We do not know whether a
nonbank controlled firm is really controlled by
a bank through indirect participation, or whether a
bank-controlled firm is really a family firm. This
provides a blurred image of what the real ownership
structure is. We should mention that it is quite
common, in Spain, to find indirect investments by
banks in different firms. Remarkably, this feature
reinforces our main result because we would expect
even more expropriation in those cases with indirect
participation by banks, as the expropriating cost
would have been lower in comparison with the case of
direct participations.
Some recommendations can be extracted from our
article. First, firms should try to promote heteroge-
neous controlling blockholders. Second, they should
try to avoid having several banks as controlling
blockholders. Finally, it is better for banks to
combine ownership and lending roles in order to
reduce expropriation problems. The investigation of
the long-term effect of such measures for perfor-
mance and risks (Nguyen and Nivoix, 2009) will be
the subject of future research.
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